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The United States as seen by Russian 
elites
Russia’s attitude and reaction towards the US 
presidential election have been determined by 
a number of factors. The first is the Russian elite’s 
perception of the United States’ position in the 
international balance of power. The second factor 
is the role of the US in Russia’s foreign policy and 
the present state of Russian-American relations. 
The third factor is Russia’s extreme disenchant-
ment with Trump’s policy and the memory of 
the crushed hopes which Moscow had cherished 
when Trump took office back in 2017. The fourth 
is Moscow’s calculations regarding the policy it 
expects the candidates to follow if elected. The 
fifth factor is the experience of Russia’s interfer-
ence in the 2016 US elections. 
The Russian elites’ perception of the United States 
is based on two elements. On the one hand, for 
many years these elites have been predicting an 
inexorable decline of American (and the West’s, 
more generally speaking) global hegemony. 
In their opinion, the US is undergoing a serious 
political crisis; it appears riven by divisions, with 
Russia on the US presidential elections 
Neutrality, with a slight tilt towards Trump
Witold Rodkiewicz
Russia’s ruling elite believes that the outcome of the US presidential elections will have only a negligible 
impact on Washington’s policy towards Moscow, because the American establishment is convinced 
that Russia under Vladimir Putin has consistently pursued an anti-American policy. In Russia’s view, 
each candidate has both strong and weak points, but in the end the Kremlin would prefer to see 
Donald Trump remain in the White House. To this end, Moscow has been active – particularly in the 
sphere of propaganda – with the aim of weakening Joe Biden’s candidacy and stoking domestic 
tensions in American society. However, the scope of Russia’s activity seems more limited compared 
to the previous electoral campaign. However, Moscow is likely to step up its activities should a po-
litical conflict emerge over the outcome of the election. A victory for the Democratic presidential 
candidate will result in revisions in US policy towards Russia. The incoming Biden administration can 
be expected to combine tough rhetoric on its divergences with Russia in the field of values with at-
tempts to find areas where their interests converge and where cooperation can take place (such as 
arms control, the resolution of regional conflicts and the fight against terrorism), complemented by 
efforts to coordinate the West’s policy towards Russia.
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its government proving incapable of coping with 
basic social problems (drug abuse, crime, racial 
tensions) or the COVID-19 epidemic. They see the 
US as a country which is on the brink of revolution, 
or a collapse similar to that which happened in 
the USSR at the turn of the 1990s. 
On the other hand, Russia’s ruling elites view 
the United States as the main obstacle blocking 
their aspirations in the international arena, and 
as the biggest, even an existential threat to the 
survival of the Russian regime. The US is per-
ceived as Russia’s main rival in the international 
arena (Russian political journalists tend to refer 
to the US using the Cold War-era term ‘principal 
adversary’). It poses a triple threat to Russia due 
to its military power, the role of the US dollar 
in the global economy, and its resort to ‘colour 
revolutions’ as an instrument of foreign policy. 
The Kremlin believes that Washington deliber-
ately destabilises entire regions and instigates 
mass protest movements under the pretexts of 
democratisation and defence of human rights, in 
order to topple those governments/regimes that 
refuse to accept the US’s hegemony and replace 
them with pro-American political forces. It seems 
that the Kremlin has been convinced since at least 
2011 that Washington is ready to use a similar set 
of instruments to target Russia. 
As a consequence, the principal goal of Russia’s 
foreign policy is to weaken the position of the 
United States globally and to build a new interna-
tional system that would curb the US’s freedom 
to act, while at the same time creating a safe 
environment for the present Russian system of 
power by protecting it from any foreign interfer-
ence (of the kind, for example, carried out under 
the aegis of humanitarian interventions or the 
defence of human rights). A good example of 
the Kremlin’s idea of how such a system should 
operate is its attitude to the Chemical Weapons 
Convention (CWC) and the Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). While Russia either 
still insists (CWC) or has insisted (INF) that these 
documents should remain in force, at the same 
time it did not feel obliged to abide by their provi-
sions. In Moscow’s view, the restrictions contained 
in these documents should be binding on the 
remaining signatories, but not on Russia.
While the Kremlin pursues an essentially anti-Amer-
ican policy, at the same time it is interested in 
preventing Russia’s rivalry with the United States 
from becoming a comprehensive Cold War-like 
confrontation accompanied by an arms race. This 
is because, being economically and technologically 
weaker than the US, Russia would likely lose this 
confrontation. It seems that the Kremlin’s strate-
gic objective is to create a situation in which the 
US, worn down by Moscow’s hit-and-run tactics 
aiding warfare and exhausted by the cost of global 
politics, will be forced to come to an agreement 
with Russia establishing a bilateral modus vivendi 
on Russia’s conditions; it is no coincidence that 
senior officials of the Russian regime have made 
references in their public statements to the ‘Yalta 
order’ as a model for Russia’s relations with the 
West.
Russia’s restrained attitude during 
the electoral campaign
Although back in 2016 Moscow had an unambig-
uously negative opinion about Hillary Clinton’s 
candidacy, and was highly positive (even enthu-
siastic) about the candidacy of Donald Trump, 
in the recent campaign the Kremlin’s actions 
were based on a more nuanced assessment. 
Most importantly, Moscow is convinced that the 
causes of the conflict between Russia and the 
US are deeply structural, and so – regardless of 
which candidate will finally make it to the White 
House – no significant change in the US’s policy 
towards Russia should be expected. Nor should 
any major improvement in Russian-American 
relations be expected. From the point of view 
of Russian interests, both candidates have their 
strong and weak points, although it seems that 
Trump was the preferred candidate, especially 
for the Kremlin.
The Russian elite believes that the 
election outcome will have a negli-
gible impact on Washington’s policy 
towards Moscow.
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One important difference between the pre-elec-
tion situation back in 2016 and the situation in 
2020 is that in 2016 the victory for the Democratic 
Party nominee seemed almost certain. In these 
circumstances, the Kremlin’s positive attitude 
towards the other candidate, alongside Russia’s 
clandestine activity in cyberspace, were mainly 
intended to politically weaken and discredit Hillary 
Clinton, as well as to stoke the conflicts within 
the American political establishment and Ameri-
can society at large. The most reported and best 
documented example of such activity involved 
stealing and publicising e-mail correspondence 
between Democratic Party activists which exposed 
the undemocratic methods the party apparatus 
had used to push through Ms Clinton’s candidacy. 
In contrast, ahead of the 2020 election, the final 
outcome remained uncertain despite the Demo-
cratic candidate’s poll advantage. The increasing 
likelihood that Joe Biden will achieve victory in 
the final stage of the electoral campaign has 
prompted the Kremlin to signal its openness to 
dialogue with the new administration. Expressing 
his concern over Biden’s “harsh anti-Russian rhet-
oric”, President Putin has emphasised left-wing 
values as the basis for establishing contacts with 
the Democratic administration. He claimed that 
he himself subscribed to such left-wing values as 
a former ‘idealistic’ member of the Communist 
Party. In addition, Putin suggested that the left 
wing of the Democratic Party should appreciate 
the fact that he is an heir to the Soviet tradition 
of anti-racist struggle. In addition, the Krem-
lin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov flatly denied that 
Trump’s candidacy was more to the Kremlin’s 
‘liking’. 
Russia’s lower level of interference in 
the elections
Russia has launched a number of actions intended 
not so much to influence the electoral outcome as 
to weaken the United States, both by aggravating 
political and social conflicts and by propagating 
doubts regarding the fairness of the electoral 
process, the country’s democratic mechanisms, 
and the trustworthiness of American public 
institutions. Since most of these actions have been 
carried out online, only very tentative hypotheses 
are possible here, based on public announcements 
by the American authorities and media reports, 
but always bearing in mind that the issue of Rus-
sian interference in the election has been subject 
to heavy political instrumentalisation.
The scale of this interference is difficult to com-
pare with that of 2016 because the US has un-
dertaken a number of preventive measures since 
then. In addition, it seems that Moscow too has 
drawn conclusions from the previous elections; 
this time its interference has not crossed a cer-
tain threshold, and was mainly limited to prop-
aganda and disinformation activities carried out 
on social media. These activities were intended 
to weaken and discredit Biden’s candidacy and to 
aggravate social and political divides. In addition, 
the Russians have tried to better conceal their 
activities. For example, they set up new online 
media channels and recruited Americans as their 
content contributors. Unlike in 2016, there were 
no spectacular cases involving the publication of 
illegally seized private correspondence; nor have 
any major attempts to penetrate the electoral 
systems’ cybernetic infrastructure been recorded. 
However, US cybersecurity experts expressed 
concern that Russians might have infected the 
electoral systems with sleeper viruses that may 
become activated during the vote counting pro-
cess. Thus far, though, it seems that these concerns 
have not been justified.
It is difficult to assess whether this low level of 
Russian interference resulted from the security 
measures already taken (sealing the systems) and 
preventive actions (such as operators of social 
networks deleting suspicious accounts), or from 
the fact that the Russian side deliberately limited 
this type of activity to avoid a situation similar to 
the one that happened in 2016. At that time, the 
disclosure of the extent and nature of this type of 
In its Russian policy, the Biden admin-
istration will combine harsh rhetoric 
with attempts to find areas of con-
verging interests.
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practice led to a tightening of US policy towards 
Russia; it was recognised as a state clearly hostile 
to the US, whose actions on the international 
arena required firm counteraction on the part of 
the US, and with which no cooperation – at even 
the most limited level – was possible.
Moscow’s disillusionment with Trump’s 
policy
The reason behind the more nuanced and re-
strained attitude towards the US election on the 
part of both the Kremlin and the Russian political 
establishment more generally was their profound 
disillusionment with Trump’s presidency, on which 
Moscow had initially pinned great hopes. Back 
in 2016, Trump was viewed as a candidate who 
might revise the US’s policy towards Russia and 
would be inclined to sign a strategic agreement 
(‘a great deal’) to ultimately regulate relations 
between Washington and Moscow. This posi-
tive assessment of Trump’s candidacy was based 
both on his declared intention to improve the 
US’s relations with Russia and on his criticism of 
liberal interventionism. His promise to abandon 
the Obama administration’s economic integra-
tion projects intended to consolidate the West-
ern world (e.g. TTIP and TPP) also played a role. 
Trump was seen in Moscow as a more convenient 
interlocutor, and possibly even a partner, due to 
his transaction-based approach to politics and 
his lack of experience on the international stage. 
Another important factor was that his views were 
ideologically convergent with the conservative 
worldview held by most Russian elites.
Moscow’s unprecedented abandonment of its 
routine symmetrical response to the sanctions 
imposed on it at the end of December 2016 by 
the outgoing Obama administration (in response 
to Russian interference in the electoral campaign) 
was proof of how strongly the Kremlin had been 
hoping for a change in the US’s policy towards 
Russia. Moscow’s decision not to retaliate was 
meant as a gesture of goodwill towards the in-
coming Trump administration, and was intended 
to create a favourable atmosphere for the US to 
launch a policy of a ‘new opening’ towards Russia.
However, after just a few months into the Trump 
administration, it turned out that Russia’s hopes 
were in vain. The first unpleasant surprise for 
Moscow was Trump’s decision to launch a missile 
attack on Russia’s ally, Syria’s President Bashar 
al-Assad, in response to his use of chemical weap-
on in the territory controlled by Syrian insurgents 
(April 2017). Although Trump consistently avoided 
criticising Russia and President Putin, delayed and 
softened Congress-mandated sanctions, and reit-
erated his intentions to improve the US’s relations 
with Russia, this failed to translate into specific 
concessions or any readiness on the part of the 
US to accept Moscow’s proposals leading to the 
normalisation of relations. On the contrary, both 
Congress and the presidential administration took 
steps (such as introducing new sanctions) that fur-
ther aggravated the Russian-American relationship. 
As a consequence, in their the pre-election anal-
yses Moscow-based experts close to the Russian 
state (the Russian International Affairs Council, 
the Valdai Discussion Club, commentators on 
state-controlled TV stations) almost unanimously 
agreed that Trump’s re-election would not foster 
any positive change (from Moscow’s point of 
view) in Washington’s policy towards Russia, nor 
would it result in the normalisation of bilateral 
relations. In addition, they pointed to a number 
of policy elements in Trump’s first term which 
went contrary to Russia’s interests. Their biggest 
concerns were raised by the increase in US de-
fence spending and its approach to arms control, 
including quitting the INF treaty and the intention 
of abandoning START III. The present generation 
of Russia’s rulers takes it for granted that excessive 
defence spending was one of the main reasons 
behind the collapse of the Soviet Union, and so 
they see avoiding an open arms race with the US 
as a matter of political priority.
From the Kremlin’s point of view, the Trump ad-
ministration’s readiness to use economic and 
military pressure against those states which are 
The paramount goal of Russia’s 
foreign policy is to undermine the 
global position of the United States.
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Russia’s important strategic partners (Iran) or polit-
ical clients (Syria, Venezuela) was another problem. 
In addition, Moscow had become accustomed to 
US policy towards Russia being predictable and 
‘responsible’ (in all conflict situations with Russia, 
both Republican and Democratic administrations 
took care not to ‘provoke’ it and to avoid any 
escalations of tension). This allowed the Kremlin 
to use the threat of escalation instrumentally 
against Washington, and to compensate for its 
weakness by carrying out surprise military opera-
tions (in Georgia, Ukraine and Syria). Trump’s un-
predictability, and his readiness to stoke conflicts 
and launch actions that exceeded the limits of the 
‘liberal establishment’ (putting military pressure 
on North Korea, waging a tariff ‘war’ with Beijing, 
breaking off the nuclear deal with Iran, easing 
restrictions on offensive actions in cyberspace etc.) 
repeatedly put the Kremlin in awkward situations.
Russia’s nuanced assessment 
of Joe Biden
Just as Russia’s assessment of Donald Trump dur-
ing this year’s campaign was more nuanced, and 
not as unambiguously positive as back in 2016, 
its assessment of Joe Biden was not as unambig-
uously negative as its opinions on Hillary Clinton 
four years ago. Obviously, Moscow views Biden 
as a typical representative of the American liberal 
establishment. It therefore expects that his policy 
will be based on the assumption that there is a 
fundamental conflict of values between the au-
thoritarian Russia and the West. That will make 
him a less convenient partner than Trump was. 
Moscow also expects Biden to publicly criticise 
Russia and the Russian president for violating 
democratic principles and human rights; he is also 
expected to intensify US support for democratisa-
tion processes in post-Soviet states, especially in 
Ukraine. Biden’s announced intention of restor-
ing unity to the West will also hurt Moscow, in 
particular since this approach is likely to prioritise 
the coordination of the Western states’ policies 
towards Russia. 
On the other hand, from the Kremlin’s point of 
view, the advantages of Biden’s presidency would 
include his readiness to resume arms control talks 
(he announced that he would extend the START III 
treaty which expires on 21 February 2021) and 
resume the nuclear deal with Iran. In addition, 
Moscow appreciates the fact that Biden is a more 
predictable and cautious politician than Trump, 
hence even his declared policy of confronting 
Russia will not include any radical steps which 
could trigger an escalation of conflicts or gen-
erate major costs for the US (such as structural 
economic sanctions). 
The future Biden administration’s 
policy towards Russia
Judging by the rhetoric alone, Joe Biden’s presi-
dential victory should trigger a major toughening 
of the US’s policy towards Russia. Biden has clearly 
labelled Russia as an ‘opponent’ of the United 
States, and announced that he would respond 
in a tougher and more decisive manner than his 
predecessor to actions directed by Russia against 
the US’s interests. He has also promised to restore 
the common front of Western states to coordinate 
their policy towards Russia.
However, a closer look at the announcements 
made by the Democratic presidential candidate 
and a detailed analysis of texts and statements by 
the foreign and security policy experts who are 
close to him (mainly former Obama-administration 
officials) prompt the conclusion that Washington’s 
policy (excluding its rhetoric, which will involve 
open criticism of Russia and the Kremlin) will in 
fact be more moderate, and oriented towards 
achieving an at least partial normalisation of the 
relations between the two states. It is striking 
that the declarations about future toughening 
of the US’s stance on Russia have not been ac-
companied by any specific ideas and proposals 
explaining in detail what this would involve. As 
regards sanctions, suggestions can be heard that 
Profound disillusionment with 
Trump’s presidency was the reason 
for the Kremlin’s more restrained 
attitude towards the recent US 
election.
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their potential as a policy tool has been exhausted, 
and that intensifying them will either be coun-
terproductive or will generate excessive costs for 
the United States and destabilise global markets. 
There are also suggestions about the need to 
balance a tougher policy towards Russia with 
the effort to find areas of cooperation. One can 
also detect fears that an excessively tough policy 
may ruin any prospects for future cooperation. 
The incoming Biden administration has already 
announced its intention to accept one Russian 
proposal, namely an unconditional extension of 
the START III treaty. In addition it can be expected 
that, in order to meet the expectations of a major 
portion of its electorate, this administration will 
reduce defence spending; that in turn might cast 
a shadow not only on the further reinforcement 
of NATO’s eastern flank but also on the continu-
ation of the present programme of enhanced US 
military presence in NATO’s border states.
Russia, for its part, will pursue a ‘small steps’ policy 
in order to improve the atmosphere in bilateral 
relations and to restore mutual trust. For example, 
this will involve military-to-military contacts (to 
avoid accidental confrontations, the process of so-
called ‘deconflicting’); counter-terrorism coopera-
tion, and regional conflict resolution (Syria, Libya, 
Nagorno-Karabakh, territorial disputes between 
Turkey and its neighbours in the Mediterranean 
Sea). Russia will strive to achieve a gradual nor-
malisation of bilateral relations without having to 
make concessions on any of the issues which have 
triggered the present crisis in Russia’s relations 
with the West. These mainly include the conflict 
with Ukraine and the support for al-Assad’s re-
gime in Syria.
Russia’s reactions to the potential do-
mestic post-election dispute in the US
The election in the US has confirmed the deep 
political divisions affecting this country, and so 
it is all the more likely that its outcome will be 
contested. A dispute over the election result and 
political conflict in the US will certainly be a source 
of great satisfaction for the state authorities in 
Moscow. It would confirm the Russian leadership 
in their belief that the US is experiencing a deep 
structural crisis affecting the system as a whole. 
It would also prove that thus far Russia’s policy 
towards Washington has been correct, and would 
boost the Kremlin’s belief that (regardless of the 
cost Russia has borne so far) this policy is highly 
likely to succeed. As a consequence, a potential 
post-election dispute would encourage the Rus-
sian leadership to continue on its present course 
intended to weaken the United States and the 
West, and to build an alternative regional and 
global order based on pragmatic cooperation 
with non-Western powers such as China, India, 
Iran and Turkey. 
It can be assumed that in this situation Russia 
will attempt to aggravate and extend the conflict 
triggered by the post-election dispute, most likely 
by using its information and cybernetic warfare 
tools. In addition, it will likely use this dispute in its 
propaganda, intended to undermine the prestige 
and tarnish the image of the United States and 
the Western system of democracy in the eyes of 
Russian society and the international community. 
If this crisis is prolonged, it cannot be ruled out 
that Moscow will take both diplomatic and military 
steps to test to what extent this situation limits 
the US’s capability to respond to Russia’s possible 
aggressive actions in the international arena, in 
particular those targeting Russia’s neighbours 
(e.g. Ukraine).
